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Abstract  
We study the effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout in a difference-in 
-differences framework, using data from a wave of municipal mergers in Finland 
in 2009. Analysing two pre-merger elections and three post-merger elections, 
spanning a total of 17 years, we find that municipal mergers decrease voter 
turnout by 4 percentage points in the long run in the relatively small 
municipalities compared to similar small municipalities that did not merge. As 
the average turnout rate prior to merging in this group was around 69 %, this is a 
substantial effect. We also find that virtually nothing happens to turnout in the 
municipalities that were relatively large within their merger. Furthermore, 
mergers are associated with a decrease in voters’ political efficacy and turnout 
decreases more in those municipalities that experience larger decreases in 
efficacy. 
 
Key words: Difference-in-differences, jurisdiction size, municipal mergers, voter 
turnout 
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1. Introduction 
In the last 60 years, municipal merger reforms have been implemented in a vast 
number of countries (see, e.g., Blom-Hansen et al. 2016). Policy-makers view municipal 
mergers as having many benefits. In addition to realizing economies of scale, mergers 
may be beneficial due to internalization of interjurisdictional spillovers, and due to 
increased fiscal and service provision capacity to bear expenditure or revenue shocks. 
Moreover, they may lead to increased state capacity arising from the ability to attract 
more competent municipal employees and politicians and having scope for them to 
specialize.  
However, merging also involves trade-offs as also a small size may have its own 
benefits. Besides a multitude of economic concerns with large jurisdictions (Miceli 
1993; Besley and Case 1995; Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Ellingsen 1998; Blom-Hansen 
et al. 2014; Blom-Hansen et al. 2016), mergers may have consequences for the 
functioning of local democracy. In small localities, it is easier for politicians to be 
informed about citizens’ needs as voters are closer to the decision-makers. This may 
make voters feel more efficacious and make politics less abstract (Verba and Nie 1972; 
Dahl and Tufte 1973; Oliver 2000; Treisman 2007; Lassen and Serritzlew 2011). 
Moreover, it may be easier to develop a sense of community in small jurisdictions, 
which may encourage political participation. These concerns, in turn, may feed back to 
the economic effects of mergers (Harjunen et al. 2017). On the other hand, it is possible 
that only large jurisdictions can sustain meaningful contested politics.  
These concerns have not gone unnoticed in the prior literature on municipal 
mergers. Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) find that mergers in Denmark decreased citizens’ 
political efficacy based on survey responses. They attribute this finding to increasing 
jurisdiction size. Similarly, Danish voters have lower levels of political trust (Hansen 
2013) and are less satisfied with their local governments (Hansen 2015) following local 
government consolidations. Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2016), using the same Finnish 
mergers as the current study, find that mergers had large effects on candidate selection 
and that voters care for local (pre-merger municipality level) political representation and 
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pool votes to local candidates in order to guarantee representation in the post-merger 
council in the first post-merger elections.1 
To our knowledge, the only paper that looks at turnout effects of municipal 
mergers is Koch and Rochat (2017), who find that mergers have a detrimental effect on 
turnout in Switzerland, especially in the relatively smaller merger partners. Roesel 
(2017) analyses the turnout effects due to mergers of large county-level governments 
(districts) in Germany and finds that they also decrease turnout. Clearly, more research 
is needed from different institutional contexts to shed light on how voters’ actual 
behaviour is affected by local government mergers. 
In this paper, we answer this call for more research by taking advantage of 
municipal mergers in Finland in 2009 to study voter turnout at municipal council 
elections. Using voting data at the level of polling districts, we reconstruct measures of 
voter turnout at the level of pre-merger municipalities for the three elections that 
followed the merger wave. To address the non-random selection of municipalities into 
mergers, we follow the recent methodological contribution in Harjunen et al. (2017) and 
combine merger simulations, nonparametric nearest-neighbour matching and difference-
in-differences methods. 
Our setting presents a number of advantages. First, having data at the pre-merger 
municipality level allows us to analyse heterogeneity in the effects with respect to the 
relative size of the municipalities. Second, we can follow the evolution of turnout over a 
relatively long time period (two pre-merger elections and three post-merger elections, 
spanning a total of 17 years). Third, we can combine our analysis of turnout with an 
analysis of political efficacy using survey data, thus linking two literatures usually 
considered in isolation. On the other hand, we highlight the issues in trying to 
understand the mechanisms behind the turnout effects.  
Our main finding is that municipal mergers (and the accompanying increase in 
jurisdiction size) decrease voter turnout substantially in the relatively small 
municipalities compared to similar small municipalities that did not merge. The 
decrease happens gradually. In the first post-merger elections, nothing happens to 
turnout in these municipalities. This may be explained by the fact that these first 
                                                 
1 Earlier literature also suggests that political considerations have played a role in the merger decisions in 
different countries (Bhatti and Hansen 2011; Saarimaa and Tukiainen 2014; Hyytinen et al. 2014 and 
Bruns et al. 2015). 
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elections were held before the voters had any experience on the functioning of the new 
municipality, or that mergers were a high-salience policy issue. Then in the subsequent 
two elections, turnout decreases by 4 percentage points. As the average turnout rate 
prior to merging in this group was around 69%, this is a substantial effect.  We also find 
that virtually nothing happens to turnout in the municipalities that were relatively large 
within their merger.  
Regarding political efficacy, we find that mergers are associated with a decrease 
in efficacy. We also find that turnout decreases more in those municipalities that 
experience larger decreases in efficacy. It should be noted, however, that our data on 
political efficacy is not as extensive as our data on turnout. Moreover, this evidence is 
not conclusive as political efficacy may be correlated with other factors that influence 
turnout. Nonetheless, we find these results to be interesting as they suggest that political 
efficacy and participation are closely connected. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a short 
theoretical background on the mechanisms through which mergers could affect turnout. 
In Section 3, we describe the Finnish municipalities and the 2009 merger reform. In 
Section 4, we describe our data and research design. In Section 5, we present the results. 
The last section concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
There are many mechanisms through which mergers could affect turnout. The 
standard tool of analysing turnout in political science is the rational voting model 
(Downs 1957; Riker and Ordenshook 1968). In this model, voting is costly, and voters 
get both instrumental and expressive benefits from voting. Voting affects the 
instrumental benefits only if the voter is pivotal.  
Mergers can affect all the components of this model. First, mergers may increase 
the costs of voting as voters need to acquire information about new candidates from the 
merger partners, many of which live far away from the voters.  
Second, mergers may increase or decrease the instrumental benefits of voting. On 
the one hand, mergers may increase instrumental benefits as larger municipalities are 
responsible for more money (Anderssen et al. 2014). Moreover, the stakes may increase, 
especially in remote small municipalities that face the threat of losing local services 
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(Harjunen et al. 2017). On the other hand, in small localities, it is easier for the 
politicians to be informed about the citizens’ needs. By worsening the politicians’ 
information on the needs of the voters, mergers may decrease the instrumental benefits 
received by voters. However, this effect could be mitigated by the increased probability 
of voters finding a better match for their preferences from a larger set of candidates. 
Indeed, Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2016) report that the Finnish mergers analysed in the 
current study increased the number of overall candidates to choose from for voters in 
small merged municipalities in the first elections after the mergers.  
Third, mergers typically decrease the probability of a voter being pivotal as they 
lead to more voters per candidate and per available council seat. Lyytikäinen and 
Tukiainen (2016) show that pivotal probabilities in Finnish municipalities are non-
negligible in magnitude. They also show that turnout is responsive to pivotal 
probability.  
Fourth, there are various ways that mergers may affect the expressive components 
of the model. For example, it may be easier to develop a sense of community in small 
municipalities, which encourages political participation due to expressive motives such 
as duty (Koch and Rochat 2017). As municipal size increases these motives may 
become weaker. Moreover, social pressure to vote is likely to be higher in small 
municipalities (Gerber et al. 2008; Funk 2010; DellaVigna et al. 2017). 
In addition to the rational voting model, political science literature has also 
emphasised the connection between political efficacy and participation (Clarke and 
Acock 1989; Pollock 1983). As documented by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011), mergers 
may reduce internal political efficacy of the voters, and thus, be detrimental for 
participation. 
Mergers also change district magnitude, which in turn affects the proportionality 
of the elections, as with more available seats, party vote shares map more accurately to 
seat shares. Increased proportionality also implies that the minimum vote share required 
for the seat decreases. Therefore, in more proportional systems voters may perceive that 
fewer votes are wasted, and thus, turnout is higher (Karp and Banducci 2008; Gallego et 
al. 2012; Eggers 2015). 
In addition to voters, candidates and parties may respond to mergers and this 
could have a feedback effect on turnout. This may happen through increased 
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campaigning efforts and strategic candidate placement (Powell 1986; Cox 1999). This 
may also alter voters’ incentives to vote strategically as discussed by Saarimaa and 
Tukiainen (2016). 
This list of arguments is by no means exhaustive. The point of this section is that 
mergers may affect voters’ and parties’ incentives in a myriad of ways and the resulting 
overall effect may be positive or negative, and may depend on the change in the size of 
the municipalities or their size relative to their respective mergers. Therefore, the 
question of whether and how mergers affect turnout is ultimately an empirical one.   
3. Finnish municipalities and mergers 
The following description is based on Harjunen et al. (2017) who provide an 
overview on the functioning of Finnish municipalities and the merger reform. 
Municipal tasks and revenue sources: Finland has a two-tier system of 
government consisting of the central government and municipalities. Municipalities 
have extensive tasks and fiscal autonomy, which makes municipal elections important 
from voters’ perspective. In addition to local public goods and services, municipalities 
are responsible for providing most of social and health care services along with primary 
and secondary schooling. The GDP share of municipality spending is roughly 18 
percent and they employ around 20 percent of the total workforce.2 The most important 
sources are local taxes and operating revenues, such as fees. Regional tax base and cost 
disparities are offset by a central government grant system.  
Municipal politics: Municipal councils are the main decision-making body. The 
length of the council term is four years and starts in January after the elections. The 
term from 2012 onwards was an exception because the subsequent elections were 
moved from October 2016 to April 2017. Only permanent residents of a municipality 
can vote or run for a council seat. Each municipality has only one electoral district (i.e. 
constituency) and no geographic quotas are in place, even after a merger. This implies 
that mergers may have large effects on political competition. The elections are held on 
the same day in all municipalities. Voting in advance is also possible for all voters, but 
in a more limited number of locations than on Election Day. 
                                                 
2 Currently, there is a plan in place to introduce a new middle tier from 2020 onwards, which will be 
responsible for, e.g. health and social care. 
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4. Data and research design 
4.1 Data 
Our main data source is the election database of the Finnish Ministry of Justice 
obtained through Statistics Finland. The data include the results of municipal elections 
held in 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2017. For the municipalities in the 2009 merger 
wave, the October 2008 municipal elections were already held using the merged 
municipalities as constituencies. This means that we have two pre-treatment and three 
post-treatment elections. 
To re-construct voting outcomes at the level of pre-merger municipalities, we use 
voting data at the level of polling districts, sub-municipal geographical units where 
voters are assigned to vote and at which votes are counted. Polling districts are mostly 
the same in 2008 as in 2004, allowing us to identify each polling district with a pre-
merger municipality. For subsequent elections, polling districts are modified, but 
usually identifiable through their names or from geographical designations.4 In cases 
where polling districts become unidentifiable in later years, we drop these 
municipalities and corresponding mergers from the sample. In the end, we are left with 
61 merged municipalities for which we have turnout data for all the municipal 
elections.5 
In addition to voter turnout, we also investigate the connection between mergers 
and political efficacy: citizens’ feeling that they can impact the political process (see 
Campbell et al. 1954).6 Efficacy may be an important driver of turnout. To measure this 
concept, we turn to survey data collected by Pekola-Sjöblom (2014) on a subset of 
municipalities in 2008 (before the mergers took effect) and 2011 (after the mergers).7 In 
merging municipalities, the survey is conducted at the pre-merger municipality level in 
                                                 
4 For example, polling districts in 2012 and later might take the name of the pre-merger municipality. In 
those cases, we assume that they correspond to the pre-merger municipality. 
5 The dropped municipalities are somewhat larger in terms of population and have more polling districts 
than the ones we were able to match across years. However, as we show later, we have enough data that 
the assumptions for difference-in-differences still hold in our context.  
6 Some studies separate between internal and external efficacy (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011). We do not 
have data to do so. 
7 Pekola-Sjöblom (2014) reports that the sample of the municipalities in the study were chosen so that 
they would be representative of all the municipalities in Finland. The number of individual respondents 
per municipality ranged from 13 to 388. We have checked that our results hold when using only the 
municipalities with at least a 100 respondents.  
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both years, and asks questions about the degree to which respondents feel like they can 
take part in and have an impact on local politics. The answers to that survey are coded 
on a scale of 1 to 5, larger value referring to higher efficacy. We use municipality level 
averages as our measure of efficacy. 
 
4.2 Research design	
Ideally, we would want to compare voter turnout in merged municipalities to 
voter turnout in these same municipalities had they not experienced the merger. Here we 
run into the fundamental problem of causal inference which is that we never observe 
more than one realized outcome for a single municipality. The challenge is then to 
construct a credible counterfactual that serves as the baseline when estimating the causal 
effect. The Finnish mergers were voluntarily decided by the local municipality councils, 
and thus, the merged municipalities may be different from the municipalities that did 
not merge in ways that are unobservable to us, and which may lead to selection bias. To 
address the non-random assignment issue, we follow Harjunen et al. (2017) and 
combine nearest-neighbour matching algorithm with DID methods.  
In the first step, we construct a control group by simulating all possible mergers 
involving up to ten municipalities that could have taken place according to the pre-
merger municipality map.8 We constrain these hypothetical mergers in the following 
ways: First, before we simulate the hypothetical mergers, we extract all the 
municipalities that actually underwent a merger in the period 2005–2016 from the 
municipal map. This ensures that the control group is not contaminated by 
municipalities that actually underwent a merger during our analysis period. Second, we 
only allow the simulated mergers to take place between adjacent municipalities so that 
the hypothetical new municipality is geographically contiguous. Finally, we allow the 
simulated mergers to take place only within county borders as was the case with the 
actual mergers (see Fig. 1). This procedure gives us a total of 7,295 hypothetical 
mergers that did not actually take place.  
In the second step, we use nonparametric nearest-neighbour matching based on 
merger level characteristic from the pre-merger period to find suitable controls for the 
                                                 
8 See Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014) and Harjunen et al. (2017) for further details on the procedure.  
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actual mergers from the group of hypothetical mergers.9 In our case, matching on pre-
treatment variables is the only way to control for systematic differences in observables, 
because we cannot measure most of these variables at the pre-merger municipality level 
after merging as the old municipalities cease to exist as statistical units.  
Using the actual and hypothetical mergers, we can calculate treatment intensity 
for the individual municipalities in both the treatment and control groups. That is, we 
can calculate, for example, the relative size of a municipality with respect to the merger, 
actual or hypothetical. This allows us to study the heterogeneity in the merger effects.  
We use two treatment intensity measures. The first measure is the municipality’s 
relative share of the total merger electorate. For a municipality i in merger j, this 
measure can be written as 
 
#eligible voters in municipality Share of electorate *100.
#eligible voters in merger  ij
i
j
       (1) 
 
Our second measure is the relative increase in the size of the electorate. Again, for 
a municipality i in merger j, this measure can be written as 
 
 
Relative increase in electorate
#eligible voters in merger #eligible voters in municipality 
*100.
#eligible voters in municipality  
ij
j i
i

   
  (2) 
 
Both of these measures are based on the pre-merger electorate sizes and they stay 
constant throughout the analysis period.10  
In the analysis, we will divide the municipalities into groups based these two 
measures of treatment intensity. For both measures, we find the 33rd and 66th percentiles 
                                                 
9 Following Harjunen et al. (2017), we use exact matching with respect to number of municipalities in the 
merger. The matching was based on the following covariates: total population of the merger, median 
distance of the citizens to the business center of the largest municipality in the merger, indicator for 
whether all the partners belong to the same health care cooperation unit, and within-merger heterogeneity 
in per capita taxable income, expenditures and deficit. 
10 We have selected these measures based on previous work by Lassen and Serritzlew (2011) and Koch 
and Rochat (2017). In our data, these measures are highly correlated (-0.61), but we use both of them in 
order to maintain comparability with previous literature. 
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among the merging municipalities, and use these values as thresholds. For the 
municipality’s relative share of the total merger electorate (first measure), all 
municipalities below the 33rd percentile are included in the strong treatment intensity 
group. Those municipalities make up a relatively small share of their respective merger. 
Those above the 66th percentile are included in the weak treatment intensity group, 
while those between the two values are included in the medium intensity group. For the 
relative increase in the size of the electorate, all municipalities above the 66th percentile 
are included in the strong treatment intensity group. These municipalities experienced a 
large increase in the size of their electorate (relative to the initial level). Those below the 
33rd percentile are included in the weak treatment intensity group, while those between 
the two values are included in the medium intensity group. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on turnout and the number of eligible voters 
across these treatment intensity groups and across mergers and non-mergers, in 2004 
(the last pre-merger election). Panel A splits the sample according to the municipality’s 
relative share of the total merger electorate. In both mergers and non-mergers, the 
number of eligible voters is larger in the weak treatment intensity groups, and turnout is 
higher among municipalities with a strong treatment intensity. Note that since the 
thresholds are based on the merging municipalities, the control group municipalities are 
not distributed equally across the treatment intensity groups. Panel B splits the sample 
according to the relative increase in the size of the electorate. We find similar patterns 
with this measure of treatment intensity. 
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Table 1. Means and standard deviations of turnout and the number of eligible voters, by 
merger status and treatment intensity (2004). 
  Non-Mergers Mergers 
Treatment Intensity: Weak Medium Strong Weak Medium Strong 
Panel A: By Share of 
Electorate             
Turnout 61.3 63.2 65.2 61.4 64.4 68.8 
  (5.3) (4.8) (3.6) (4.3) (7.2) (7.3) 
# of Eligible Voters 11 760 5 787 2 224 13 770 5 514 1 653 
  (8 851) (3 846) (1 073) (16 122) (6 332) (1 175) 
N 80 144 81 20 20 21 
Panel B: By Relative 
Increase in Electorate             
Turnout 61.6 63.0 65.2 61.1 64.9 68.9 
  (5.3) (4.9) (3.7) (4.4) (6.8) (7.4) 
# of Eligible Voters 11 959 5 856 2 252 13 180 5 669 1 513 
  (8 921) (3 961) (1 096) (15 945) (6 263) (1 008) 
N 76 147 82 21 20 20 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Voter turnout 
We start with a graphical representation of our main result in Fig. 2. The figure is 
constructed so that we have divided the merged and non-merged municipalities into 
groups based on the treatment measure and treatment intensity. On left panel of the 
figure, the municipalities are divided according to their relative share of the electorate 
(Eq. (1)) and on the right panel according to relative increase in the size of the electorate 
(Eq. (2)). 
We first look at the municipalities that received a weak treatment. In the two first 
graphs, we see that merged and non-merged municipalities receiving a weak treatment 
follow similar trends in turnout both before and after treatment. Turnout increases in 
2004 compared to 2000, and in 2008 compared to 2004, before decreasing again in 
2012 and 2017. This is true for both definitions of treatment intensity. 
The following two graphs in Fig. 2 illustrate turnout for municipalities receiving a 
treatment of medium intensity. Here, we see a slightly larger increase in turnout in 2008 
for merged municipalities compared to non-merged ones. Moreover, there is a slightly 
larger decline in 2012 for the merged municipalities. However, in this group of 
12 
 
municipalities, the pre-treatment common trend between merged and non-merged 
municipalities is not as clean. In fact, we observe a slightly larger increase in turnout in 
2004 for merged municipalities. 
In municipalities receiving a strong treatment, usually small municipalities in their 
merger (Table 1), we observe rather clean pre-treatment common trends for the merged 
and the non-merged municipalities. In 2008, we only observe a small increase in turnout 
for the non-merged municipalities, but not for the merged municipalities. In 2012, 
however, we observe a substantially larger decline in turnout for the merged 
municipalities compared to the non-merged ones. The effect also persists to the 2017 
elections. 
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coefficients, δk, on the interaction terms merger·year. The coefficient for the first 
interaction term δ2004 enables us to formally test the pre-treatment common trends, while 
the remaining interaction term coefficients provide us the election-specific causal effect 
of merging.  
We estimate this model separately for each treatment intensity group and for each 
definition of treatment intensity corresponding to Fig. 2.11 Table 2 presents the results of 
these estimations. First, we check the pre-treatment trends. For both the strong and 
weak treatment intensity groups, pre-treatment trends are similar between merged and 
non-merged municipalities. This is important for the causal interpretation of the results. 
However, as suspected in Fig. 2, merged and non-merged municipalities receiving a 
treatment of medium intensity already followed diverging trends in 2004, before the 
treatment.  
Columns 3 and 6 confirm the negative effect of mergers on turnout in 2012 and 
2017 in the group of municipalities receiving a treatment of strong intensity. In fact, for 
these municipalities, turnout decreases by about 4 percentage points compared to the 
control group of similar municipalities that did not merge. As the average turnout rate 
prior to merging in this group was around 69%, this is a substantial effect. Moreover, 
the difference in the average turnout between the municipalities in the weak and strong 
treatment intensity groups was equal to about 7 percentage points in the pre-treatment 
period (see Table 1). In other words, the long-term effect of merging on turnout in the 
municipalities receiving a strong treatment (usually smaller municipalities) is equivalent 
to closing more than half of the turnout gap between these municipalities and those 
receiving a weak treatment (usually larger municipalities).12 
We can also test whether the merger effects differ across treatment intensity 
groups. The coefficients in the “strong treatment” regressions (Columns 3 and 6) are 
statistically different from those in the “weak treatment” (Columns 1 and 4) in 3 of 4 
cases. Using the share of electorate, they are different at the 5% level in 2012 (p = 
                                                 
11 We could also conduct the analysis for the three groups simultaneously by also including dummy 
variables for each group and their interactions. Since this pooled model would be fully saturated, i.e. 
would include all the group dummies and interaction terms with the merger and time dummies, the results 
would be exactly the same. 
12 Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix shows results when splitting municipalities in four groups instead, 
using the four quartiles of treatment intensity. Our conclusions are similar: municipalities in the highest 
treatment intensity quartile are the ones experiencing a significant decline in turnout in 2012 and 2017.  
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0.033) and the 10% level in 2017 (p = 0.063). Using the increase in relative size, they 
are different at the 10% level in 2012 (p = 0.096), but not significant in 2017 (p = 
0.109). 
 
Table 2. Effect of mergers on turnout, by year and treatment intensity. 
  Share of electorate Relative increase in electorate 
  
Weak 
treatment 
Medium 
treatment 
Strong 
treatment 
Weak 
treatment 
Medium 
treatment 
Strong 
treatment 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Constant 59.71*** 63.60*** 65.50*** 59.97*** 63.35*** 65.48*** 
  [1.160] [0.770] [0.748]   [1.185] [0.800] [0.740]    
Merger 0.074 -0.434 2.301 0.04 -0.249 2.54 
  [1.621] [1.664] [1.584]   [1.618] [1.677] [1.626]    
2004 1.586*** -0.416 -0.263 1.631*** -0.352 -0.323 
  [0.424] [0.390] [0.623]   [0.437] [0.381] [0.638]    
2008 4.244*** 1.989*** 1.860**  4.433*** 2.007*** 1.764*   
  [0.605] [0.542] [0.917]   [0.572] [0.548] [0.944]    
2012 1.964*** -0.637 0.814 1.836*** -0.471 0.745 
  [0.572] [0.534] [0.995]   [0.549] [0.559] [1.002]    
2017 2.012*** -1.402** -0.422 1.803*** -1.174* -0.482 
  [0.698] [0.553] [0.844]   [0.658] [0.601] [0.851]    
Merger * 2004 0.069 1.643* 1.219 -0.548 2.184*** 1.242 
  [0.674] [0.939] [0.931]   [0.874] [0.716] [0.966]    
Merger * 2008 0.862 2.924*** -0.628 0.509 2.742*** -0.391 
  [0.898] [0.941] [1.368]   [0.868] [0.986] [1.417]    
Merger * 2012 -0.846 -0.977 -4.382*** -1.304 -0.819 -4.255*** 
  [0.933] [1.107] [1.457]   [1.065] [1.018] [1.500]    
Merger * 2017 -0.945 -0.234 -4.064*** -1.12 -0.464 -3.877*** 
  [1.047] [1.162] [1.387]   [1.064] [1.185] [1.429]    
N  500 820 510 485 835 510 
R2 0.073 0.069 0.082 0.082 0.062 0.082 
Notes: The results are from OLS models. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level and 
reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, 
respectively. 
 
5.2 Political efficacy 
Previous work (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Koch and Rochat 2017) has 
emphasized the role of political efficacy as a possible mediator of merger effects on 
political participation. Next we turn to analysing the connection between mergers and 
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political efficacy, and the role of the latter in explaining the turnout decrease. Since the 
number of municipalities with data on political efficacy before and after the mergers is 
rather small, we cannot divide the merged municipalities into treatment intensity 
groups. Instead, we estimate a simple DID model using the merger dummy as a 
treatment variable. 
In table 3, we present results from two regression models. In the first column, we 
report the results from a DID regression model where we use two years of data on 
efficacy (2008 and 2011). The efficacy score decreased on average by 0.169 due to 
mergers, which corresponds to roughly two standard deviations in the score in 2008. 
This result is in line with prior literature, but since we cannot analyse pre-treatment 
trends we are reluctant to make strong causal claims regarding mergers and efficacy. 
 
Table 3. Political efficacy and change in turnout. 
  Efficacy 
Change in 
turnout 
Constant 3.075*** -3.238*** 
  [0.024]    [0.717]    
Merger 0.042   
  [0.031]      
2011 0.025   
  [0.035]      
Merger*2011 -0.169***   
  [0.053]      
Change in efficacy   10.98*** 
    [2.504]    
N  86 24 
R2 0.188 0.302 
Notes: The results are from OLS models. The first column reports results from a DID model using data 
from 2008 and 2011 and the efficacy score as the dependent variable. The second column reports results 
from a model using only the merged municipalities. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
In the second column, we report the result from regressing the change in turnout 
between 2008 and 2012 on the change in efficacy between 2008 and 2011 using only 
the merged municipalities. The change in efficacy is strongly and positively associated 
with the change in turnout. In fact, back-of-the-envelope calculations combining the 
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results from the two columns in Table 3 suggest that the decrease in efficacy in the 
merged municipalities is enough to explain a decrease in turnout of about 1.8 percent. 
The results show that mergers have a negative effect on turnout in municipalities 
that are small relative to the merger as a whole and that efficacy is potentially an 
important mediator of the mergers’ effect on turnout. However, our data on efficacy is 
not as extensive as our data on turnout and the efficacy scores may be correlated with 
other mediating mechanisms. Disentangling different mediating mechanisms is difficult 
as there are many of them and not all are easy or even possible to measure. Moreover, 
even if they were observable, learning about causal mechanisms is difficult and rests on 
strong assumptions (Imai et al. 2011). Therefore, we are reluctant to draw too strong 
conclusions with respect to the connection between political efficacy and turnout. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We study the effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout and political efficacy 
in a difference-in-differences framework, using data on a wave of mergers in Finland in 
2009. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, municipal mergers (and 
the accompanying increase in jurisdiction size) decrease voter turnout substantially (4 
percentage points) in the relatively small municipalities compared to similar small 
municipalities that did not merge. The long-term effect of merging on turnout in the 
municipalities receiving a strong treatment (usually smaller municipalities) is equivalent 
to closing more than half of the turnout gap between these municipalities and those 
receiving a weak treatment (usually larger municipalities). 
We also document a negative effect of municipal mergers on political efficacy, 
and a positive association between efficacy and turnout. While suggesting that efficacy 
can have a role in explaining the effects of mergers on turnout, the evidence is not 
conclusive as political efficacy may be correlated with other factors that influence 
turnout. Even though our study does not provide us with a complete understanding of 
the mechanisms at work, the fact that mergers do affect turnout and efficacy is an 
interesting and policy-relevant result as such. These results provide further evidence that 
local democracy concerns are warranted in the context of merger reforms. 
Given that similar findings have been reported regarding efficacy in Denmark 
(Lassen and Serritzlew 2011) and turnout in Switzerland (Koch and Rochat 2017), it 
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seems that the results may generalize to other countries as well. However, all of these 
results are from countries that use open-list proportional representation in local 
elections. It would be a fruitful avenue for future research to analyse whether the results 
carry over to other electoral systems. 
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Appendix: Additional results 
 
Table A1. Effect of mergers on turnout, by year and four groups of treatment intensity 
(using share of electorate). 
Treatment Intensity 
Percentiles: 
Share of electorate 
        
[0,25[ [25,50[ [50,75[ [75,100] 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
Constant 61.845*** 60.620*** 64.928*** 65.480*** 
  [1.686] [0.843] [0.878] [0.982] 
Merger -2.224 -0.369 1.069 3.140 
  [2.131] [1.763] [1.526] [2.072] 
2004 1.185** 0.838* -0.751* -0.098 
  [0.474] [0.447] [0.393] [0.746] 
2008 3.712*** 3.596*** 1.257** 2.204* 
  [0.793] [0.635] [0.500] [1.123] 
2012 1.074 0.909 -0.663 1.213 
  [0.773] [0.680] [0.513] [1.152] 
2017 1.298 0.891 -1.912*** -0.226 
  [0.824] [0.745] [0.453] [1.011] 
Merger * 2004 0.775 -0.928 3.455*** 0.388 
  [0.778] [1.144] [0.699] [1.089] 
Merger * 2008 1.695 1.158 2.610*** -1.450 
  [1.106] [1.134] [0.909] [1.760] 
Merger * 2012 0.491 -1.988 -1.469* -5.257*** 
  [1.140] [1.477] [0.857] [1.813] 
Merger * 2017 0.360 -1.640 -0.837 -4.951*** 
  [1.157] [1.519] [1.059] [1.652] 
N  210 665 610 345 
R2 0.091 0.084 0.078 0.091 
Notes:  The results are from OLS models. All the models include year dummies. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table A2. Effect of mergers on turnout, by year and four groups of treatment intensity 
(using increase in relative size). 
Treatment Intensity 
Percentiles: 
Increase in relative size 
        
[0,25[ [25,50[ [50,75[ [75,100] 
  [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Constant 61.799*** 60.598*** 64.862*** 65.465*** 
  [1.866] [0.894] [0.847] [1.006]    
Merger -2.419 0.519 0.510 3.154 
  [2.316] [1.841] [1.504] [2.085]    
2004 1.384*** 0.747* -0.584 -0.167 
  [0.497] [0.431] [0.403] [0.784]    
2008 3.766*** 3.499*** 1.494*** 2.103*   
  [0.886] [0.625] [0.514] [1.172]    
2012 0.965 0.893 -0.441 0.996 
  [0.866] [0.684] [0.509] [1.189]    
2017 1.280 0.875 -1.679*** -0.397 
  [0.887] [0.762] [0.475] [1.054]    
Merger * 2004 0.511 -0.433 3.098*** 0.458 
  [0.824] [1.109] [0.721] [1.116]    
Merger * 2008 1.713 1.272 2.330** -1.349 
  [1.208] [1.076] [0.915] [1.792]    
Merger * 2012 0.543 -2.004 -1.443* -5.040**  
  [1.246] [1.435] [0.853] [1.838]    
Merger * 2017 0.253 -1.595 -0.829 -4.780*** 
  [1.235] [1.511] [1.057] [1.679]    
N  185 670 635 340 
R2 0.098 0.075 0.067 0.092 
Notes:  The results are from OLS models. All the models include year dummies. Standard errors are 
clustered at the municipality level and reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance 
at 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
